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INTRODUCTION

T

he modern world is characterized by an unprecedented
amount of contact among sovereign states. “Growth in
international activity and dramatic technological changes have
greatly increased the frequency with which national legal systems must interact.”1 This intensified interaction has, in turn,
resulted in a surge in disputes involving various aspects of private international law.2
Copyright law is an area of private law which easily assumes
this kind of international character3 because its subject matter
effortlessly crosses geographical borders.4 This trait has been
augmented by the development of the Internet and communication technologies.5 Scholars point out several important factors
contributing to the ever-increasing importance of copyright law
in the international arena. First, technological development
allows a user easy worldwide access to copyrighted works to a
degree unthinkable before.6 Second, the Internet threatens the
traditional territorial principle of copyright law.7 Finally, copyright law has acquired outstanding importance as a result of
the “shift of emphasis from manufactured goods to ideas, infor-

1. Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. L. J.
883, 884 (2002) [hereinafter Guzman, Choice of Law].
2. Mathias Reimann, A New Restatement-For the International Age, 75
IND. L.J. 575, 579 (2000) (pointing out that “the number of international disputes has grown continuously in the last few decades”).
3. Marshall Leaffer, International Copyright from an American Perspective, 43 ARK. L. REV. 373, 373 (1990) (noting that “the international dimension
of copyright law grows in importance each day”).
4. Matt Jackson, Harmony or Discord? The Pressure Toward Conformity
in International Copyright, 43 IDEA 607, 629 (2003); Leaffer, supra note 3, at
373.
5. Curtis A. Bradley, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Intellectual
Property Law: Principal Paper: Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an
Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 503, 584 (1997).
6. Leaffer, supra note 3, at 373.
7. Id. See also Paul Edward Geller, Conflicts of Law in Cyberspace: International Copyright in a Digitally Networked World, in 4 INFORMATION LAW
SERIES, THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 27, 28 (P. Bernt
Hugenholtz ed., 1996) (pointing out that “[d]igital media allow transmitters
and receivers to switch roles interactively, and to be linked among themselves
in fluid and variegated patterns, potentially affecting both creation and dissemination at any and all points in increasingly global networks”).
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mation, and images – the subject matter of intellectual property….”8
These factors exacerbate old legal problems and may even
create new ones in international copyright disputes.9 One cluster of traditional problems that has gained new importance is
that of conflict of laws questions surrounding both initial copyright ownership and transfer of rights.10
Problems regarding ownership and transfer of rights have
been compounded by the growing transparency of national borders,11 the shift from industrial to information markets12 and
burgeoning participation of copyrighted works in international
commerce.13
These changes have, in turn, put unbearable pressure on the
traditional interpretation of the principle of national treatment
enshrined in the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.14 According to the conventional understanding of national treatment, the law of a protecting country
should determine all the issues of copyright, including ownership.15 This approach also comports with the related principle of
territoriality because it regards copyright as consisting of sepa8. Samuel K. Murumba, Globalizing Intellectual Property: Linkage and
the Challenge of a Justice-Constituency, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 435, 435
(1998).
9. Peter Nicolas, The Use of Preclusion Doctrine, Antisuit Injunctions, and
Forum Non Convenience Dismissals in Transnational Intellectual Property
Litigation, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 331, 334 (1999).
10. See generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT 104 (2001);
Jane C. Ginsburg, Ownership of Electronic Rights and the Private International Law of Copyright, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 165, 169–70 (1998) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Ownership].
11. Geller, supra note 7, at 28.
12. See Lorin Brennan, Financing Intellectual Property Under Revised
Article 9: National and International Conflicts, HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J.
313, 316 (2001); Jackson, supra note 4, at 628.
13. See Monica E. Antezana, The European Union Internet Copyright Directive as Even More than it Envisions: Toward a Supra-EU Harmonization of
Copyright Policy and Theory, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 415, 440 (2003);
Jackson, supra note 4, at 627.
14. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (Paris revision, July 24, 1971) [hereinafter
Berne Convention].
15. See STEPHEN M. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING
RIGHTS 38–39 (2d ed. 1989); EUGEN ULMER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 11 (1978).
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rate sets of rights for each sovereign state.16 But the disparate
copyright regimes envisioned by this conventional understanding hinder the uniform worldwide exploitation of a literary
work.17 It is for this reason that the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Itar-Tass v. Russian Kurier, Inc.
rejected this conventional interpretation of national treatment.18
The court found that the national treatment principle did not
contain a choice of law provision19 and held that ownership of a
copyright should be determined by the law of the country with
the most substantial relationship to the work.20 By rejecting the
uniform application of the law of a protecting country, Itar-Tass
imported the modern conflict of laws analysis into the world of
copyright law, which, until that point, had completely ignored
conflict of laws issues.21 Such an approach has the virtue of establishing a single root of title to copyrighted works, thus facilitating their distribution and exploitation.22 It is also more flexible than the traditional approach.
However, its application creates a number of serious problems: the fact that a general conflict of laws approach eludes
predictability; the difficulties associated with interpreting foreign laws and determining what degree of deference should be
given to a foreign judiciary; and obstacles to enforcing decisions.
In Films by Jove v. Berov (“Films by Jove II”), the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, attempting

16. Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright: From a “Bundle” of National Copyright Laws to a Supranational Code?, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A. 265, 284, 289 (2000) [hereinafter Ginsburg, International Copyright].
17. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property Litigation: A Vehicle for Resurgent Comparativist Thought?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 429,
438–39 (2001) [hereinafter Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property];
Ginsburg, International Copyright, supra note 16, at 284, 289.
18. Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, 153 F.3d 82, 89–91
(2d Cir. 1998).
19. Id. at 89. See also Ginsburg, Ownership, supra note 10, at 168–69;
William Patry, Choice of Law and International Copyright, 48 AM. J. COMP. L.
383, 404 (2000) [hereinafter Patry, Choice of Law]; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10,
at 102–04.
20. Itar-Tass, 153 F.3d at 91.
21. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property, supra note 17, at 438–
40.
22. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, at 104; Ginsburg, Ownership, supra note 10,
at 169–70.

File: Gannamacro.doc

902

Created on: 2/14/2004 4:07 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 4/21/2004 1:48 PM

[Vol. 29:2

to apply Itar-Tass, was confronted with many of these same
problems.23
A universal copyright regime would resolve these problems,
but thus far it has remained an unattainable goal.24 In the
meantime, scholars have developed two principle methods of
ameliorating the difficulties: the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg procedural
approach,25 and the substantive approach suggested by Graeme
Dinwoodie.26
This Note’s principal thesis is that, by themselves, these salutary attempts to deal with a pressing problem are inadequate
unless supplemented by the establishment of supranational
equitable principles. The establishment of a supranational
body of equitable principles would be a step towards universal
copyright law, and would be easier to achieve because it would
not cause interference with sensitive policies underlying national copyright regimes. Once established, the universal law of
equity could help to protect third parties and good-faith purchasers in transnational copyright transactions, thus facilitating worldwide exploitation and distribution of copyrighted
works.
Part I looks at the traditional approach of copyright law to
conflict of laws problems under the Berne principle of national
treatment. Part II discusses the parallel universe of the conflict
of laws doctrine, which has undergone a revolutionary shift
from the territorial approach of the First Restatement27 to the

23. Films by Jove, Inc. v. Berov, 154 F. Supp. 2d 432 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) [hereinafter Films by Jove I]; Films by Jove, Inc. v. Berov, 250 F. Supp. 2d 156
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) [hereinafter Films by Jove II].
24. See Graeme W. Austin, Valuing “Domestic Self-Determination” in International Intellectual Property Jurisprudence, 77 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1155,
1211 (2002) (commenting on “the need and ability for individual nations to do
some things differently in the intellectual property sphere”).
25. See generally Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property
Matters, 77 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1065 (2002).
26. See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469 (2000)
[hereinafter Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order]; Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The
Development and Incorporation of International Norms in the Formation of
Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733 (2001) [hereinafter Dinwoodie, The Development].
27. See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
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modern functional analysis.28 Part III focuses on the rejection of
territorial interpretation of the national treatment doctrine and
acceptance of the modern conflict of laws doctrine by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Itar-Tass.
Part IV discusses the problems involved in the application of
the modern conflict of laws doctrine to the issue of copyright
ownership and transfer of rights. These problems are clearly
demonstrated by the decisions of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York in Films by Jove I
and II29 applying the Itar-Tass holding to a more complicated
set of facts. Finally, Part V suggests that many of these problems can be solved by the application of supranational equitable
principles, in particular the doctrine of apparent authority,
aimed at providing certainty and security in commercial transactions.
I. CONFLICT OF LAWS IN THE BERNE CONVENTION PRINCIPLE OF
NATIONAL TREATMENT
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“Berne Convention”) is one of the most influential
copyright treaties in the world.30 First established in 1886, in
Berne, Switzerland,31 this Convention is now administered by
the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), an intergovernmental organization created under the auspices of the
United Nations.32 Until March 1, 1989, “the United States was
the only major western country not a member” of the Berne

28. See generally CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963)
[hereinafter CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS]; William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and
the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (1963); DAVID CAVERS, THE
CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 22–23 (1965); Arthur Von Mehren, Recent Trends in
Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 927, 938 (1975).
29. Films by Jove I, 154 F. Supp. 2d 432; Films by Jove II, 250 F. Supp. 2d
156.
30. Stephen Fraser, The Copyright Battle: Emerging International Rules
and Roadblocks on the Global Information Infrastructure, 15 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 759, 762.
31. Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and Key Role in the
Future, 3 J.L. & TECH. 1, 7 (1998).
32. World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) Website, at http://
www.wipo.org/about-wipo/en/gib.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
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Convention33 that at that time encompassed some 85 nations,
including America’s major trading partners.34 China joined
WIPO in 199235 and Russia followed suit in 1995.36
A. National Treatment as a Compromise Between Universal
Copyright and National Policies
Article I of the Berne Convention unambiguously states that
“[t]he countries to which this Convention applies constitute a
Union for the protection of the rights of authors in their literary
and artistic works.”37 The leading authority on the Convention,
Professor Sam Ricketson, notes that “the expression ‘author’ is
left unidentified, although it occurs with great frequency
throughout the substantive provisions of the Convention.”38
This is because the main focus of the Berne Convention was not
so much on authorship as on the protection given to authors.39
Since the very inception of the Berne Convention, two distinct
approaches to the protection of authors’ rights “have vied for
primacy.”40 These principles are “the non discrimination principle of national treatment” which “preserves the integrity of domestic legislation,” and the principle of universal copyright
norms, which “guarantee[s] international uniformity and predictability.”41 At the diplomatic conference of 1884, one of the
preparatory stages to the Berne Convention,42 the German delegation declared itself a “strong supporter of universal codification,”43 proposing the following question to the Conference:
33. MARSHALL LEAFFER, INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 357 (2d ed. 1997).
34. MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 513 (1999) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW].
35. Connie Neigel, Piracy in Russia and China: A Different U.S. Reaction,
63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 179, 193 (2000).
36. Id.
37. Berne Convention, supra note 14, art. 1. See also Burger, supra note
31, at 16 (pointing out that this focus on the protection of authors indicated
the Continental European influence).
38. SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986 158 (1987).
39. Id. at 39.
40. Ginsburg, International Copyright, supra note 16, at 267.
41. Id. at 267.
42. RICKETSON, supra note 38, at 58.
43. Id. at 59.
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Instead of concluding a convention based on the principle of
national treatment, would it not be preferable to aim for a
codification, in the framework of a convention, regulating in a
uniform manner for the whole projected Union, and in the
framework of a convention, the totality of dispositions relating
to the protection of copyright?44

The French, Swedish and Swiss delegations did not approve
of this initiative “in the light of the many differences in national
copyright law which still existed.”45 Instead, the parties accepted a compromise motion of the Swiss Government which
stated:
Whereas, desirable as may be a universal codification of the
principles which regulate the protection of the rights of authors, in view of the differences in existing laws and conventions, it is to be feared that such a project would postpone for a
long time the conclusion of a general understanding….46

Although the agreed upon approach “institutes national
treatment,” it also tries to avoid local underprotection by creating a floor of minimum substantive standards that member
countries must adopt.”47 Both tenets are embodied in Article
5(1) of the Convention which states that:
Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are
protected under this Convention, in countries of the Union
other than the country of origin, the rights which their respective laws do now and or may hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as the rights specifically granted by this Convention.48

The principle of national treatment requires member states
to afford copyright owners from other Berne countries the same
protection as that accorded to their own citizens.49

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

RICKETSON, supra note 38, at 59.
Id.
Id.
Ginsburg, International Copyright, supra note 16, at 267.
Berne Convention, supra note 14, art. 5(1).
2 WILLIAM PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 1273 (1994).

File: Gannamacro.doc

906

Created on: 2/14/2004 4:07 PM

Last Printed: 4/21/2004 1:48 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 29:2

B. The Traditional Territorial Approach to National
Treatment
Traditionally, the principle of national treatment was understood as a territorial approach, dictating that the law of a protecting country applies to all issues in international copyright
disputes.50 A prominent European scholar, Eugen Ulmer, specifically states that “the question of who is the first owner of
copyright is also decided in accordance with the law of the country where protection is claimed.”51 Although there is some ambiguity as to whether a protecting country should be interpreted
as a forum country or a country of infringement,52 most scholars
believe a protecting country to be a forum country.53 This preference for the forum law is premised upon the greater comfort
that courts feel in applying their own law as opposed to foreign
law;54 this comfort is expected, in turn, to improve the quality of
judgments55 and to guarantee more certainty.56 An additional
benefit of this approach is that owners of rights are not affected
by confiscation or exploitation measures in the country of the
work’s origin whenever these measures are invalid in the protecting countries; for instance, “where a publisher had been expropriated in East Germany, the West German courts held that
his reproduction and distribution rights in the Federal Republic
are not affected.”57
The principle of national treatment was reinforced by the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (“TRIPs”) in 1994.58 Although TRIPs relies mainly on the
50. Edward J. Ellis, National Treatment under the Berne Convention and
the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 36 IDEA 327, 331 (1996).
51. ULMER, supra note 15, at 11.
52. RICKETSON, supra note 38, at 226 (commenting that “it remains an
open question under the Convention” whether a protecting country should be
interpreted as a forum country or a country where an infringing act occurred,
although in most cases they will be the same).
53. STEWART, supra note 15, at 37 (pointing out that the Berne Convention
in its principle of national treatment accepted “broadly speaking lex fori”).
54. STEWART, supra note 15, at 37.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 39.
58. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round
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Berne Convention principles,59 its protection of copyright goes
further than Berne.60 The primary significance of TRIPs is “the
extension of the enforcement mechanism of the [World Trade
Organization (“WTO”)] to intellectual property obligations.”61
An important aspect of the TRIPs Agreement was treating
copyright as “a trade issue rather than an information policy
issue.”62 For instance, “[t]he ultimate decision of developing
countries to consent to TRIPs was not motivated by a belief that
greater protection for [Intellectual Property]” was in their interest; it was prompted, instead, “by a desire to obtain concessions in other areas.”63
Scholars agree that dispute resolution based on TRIPs and
the WTO framework evidences the beginning of the formation of
uniform international copyright law.64 Nevertheless, although
TRIPs strengthens and broadens copyright protection somewhat, it preserves the dichotomy between international and
domestic laws by creating a floor — not a ceiling — for the copyright protection member states are obligated to enact into their
domestic laws. Consequently, it retains the national treatment
principle that “private litigation would be resolved by the application of national law.”65
II. THE CONFLICT OF LAWS REVOLUTION IN CONTRACT
AND TORT LAW
International copyright law has long escaped the reach of the
general conflict of laws analysis because it adhered to the conventional interpretation of the national treatment doctrine, according to which, “the courts in the state where infringement
occurs nearly always apply their own national law.”66 Copyright
vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994). See also Ruth Okediji, TRIPS Dispute Settlement and the Sources of (International) Copyright Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A. 585, 585 (2001).
59. Id. at 598.
60. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 34, at 539 (characterizing TRIPs as a “‘Berne plus’ approach to protection”).
61. Okediji, supra note 58, at 634.
62. Jackson, supra note 4, at 635.
63. Andrew T. Guzman, International Antitrust and the WTO, 43 VA. J.
INT’L L. 933, 950 (2003) [hereinafter Guzman, International Antitrust].
64. See Okediji, supra note 58, at 634–35; Jackson, supra note 4, at 622.
65. Dinwoodie, The Development, supra note 26, at 777.
66. STEWART, supra note 15, at 39.
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law, thus, remained territorial and isolated from the parallel
conflict of laws revolution that had taken place in tort and contract cases67 where the rigid territorial approach was displaced
by various forms of “interest analysis.”68
A. Beale’s Territorial Approach of “Vested Rights”
The traditional territorial approach in the American conflict
of laws doctrine had been represented by Joseph Beale,69 a reporter for Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws.70 His doctrine
of “vested rights” was based “on a view that every state has exclusive jurisdiction over its territory.”71 Beale stated that “a
right having been created by the appropriate law, the recognition of its existence should follow everywhere.”72 However, although Beale’s approach was very influential and enjoyed support among scholars and the courts when pronounced, it came
under widespread criticism, in the 1950s and 1960s, for its inflexibility and arbitrariness in the choice of the moment when
rights vested and, consequently, the jurisdiction, under which
rights have vested. According to Beale’s general principle,
“[r]ights were considered to have vested in the jurisdiction
where the last act necessary to complete the cause of action occurred.”73 For instance, in the case of torts, the rigid rule dictated that the jurisdiction where the rights of the parties vested
was the place of the wrong;74 in contracts, the place of the contract formation.75 Needless to say, such a rule often brought
arbitrary and unjust results.76
67. Kurt Siehr, Revolution and Evolution in Conflicts Law, 60 LA. L. REV.
1353, 1353 (2000).
68. See generally CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 28; Baxter, supra
note 28; CAVERS, supra note 28.
69. See generally JOSEPH BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935).
See also Perry Dane, Vested Rights, “Vestedness,” and Choice of Law, 96 YALE
L.J. 1191, 1194 (1987).
70. Guzman, Choice of Law, supra note 1, at 890.
71. Id.
72. JAMES A. MARTIN, PERSPECTIVES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS: CHOICE OF LAW
5 (1980) (citing JOSEPH BEALE, THE SUMMARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS).
73. Guzman, Choice of Law, supra note 1, at 891.
74. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934).
75. Id. § 332.
76. See, e.g., Alabama Great Southern R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126
(1892) (where the court of Alabama denied compensation to an injured em-
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B. A Revolution in the Conflict of Laws Analysis
1. Currie’s Interest Analysis: True and False Conflicts
The main critic of Beale’s territorial approach in the 1950s
and 1960s was Brainerd Currie.77 Currie developed “an interest
analysis” by arguing that: “[w]hen a court is asked to apply the
law of a foreign state different from the law of the forum, it
should inquire into the policies expressed in the respective laws,
and into the circumstances in which it is reasonable for the respective states to assert an interest in the application of those
policies.”78 Curry divided conflicts of laws into two main groups:
false conflicts and true conflicts.79 In a “false conflict” case, the
interests of the respective states do not conflict,80 so “[if] the
court finds that one state has an interest in the application of
its policy in the circumstances of the case and the other has
none, it should apply the law of the only interested state.”81 Unfortunately, the situation becomes much more complicated
where a “true conflict” between states’ interests exists. In that
case, Currie argued that “where several states have different
policies, and also legitimate interests in the application of their
policies, a court is in no position to ‘weigh’ the competing interests, or evaluate their relative merits, and choose between them
accordingly.”82 Therefore, in true conflicts, he recommends the
use of the law of the forum: “[i]f…the court finds that a conflict
ployee of a defendant railroad having applied the law of Mississippi as a place
of injury, although both the plaintiff and the defendant were residents of
Alabama, the law of which would have allowed the recovery).
77. Dane, supra note 69, at 1201.
78. Brainerd Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
1233, 1242 (1963) reprinted in B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1963) [hereinafter Currie, Comments].
79. Brainerd Currie, Married Women’s Contracts: A Study in Conflict-ofLaws Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227, 251–52 (1958), reprinted in SELECTED
ESSAYS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963) [hereinafter Currie, Married Women’s
Contracts]. See also MARTIN, supra note 72, at 85 (noting that Currie’s most
important contribution to the choice of law doctrine was his theory of false
conflicts).
80. Currie, Married Women’s Contracts, supra note 79, at 251–52. See also
Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 301 (1969) for a good example of the application of an interest analysis to a “false conflict”.
81. Currie, Comments, supra note 78, at 1242.
82. Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflicts of
Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171, 176 (1959).
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between the legitimate interests of the two states is unavoidable, it should apply the law of the forum.”83
Although Currie’s approach to false conflicts is accepted by
the majority of courts and commentators today,84 his treatment
of true conflicts has often been considered too parochial. It has
been rejected by many scholars85 who criticize it for discriminating unfairly against nonresidents,86 encouraging forum shopping,87 and making it impossible to know in advance what law
will be applied.88 Additionally, critics argue that a preference
for the forum law does not give proper consideration to “a whole
range of policies and values…relating to effective and harmonious intercourse and relations between and among communities….”89
2. Alternative Solutions to “True Conflicts”
In response to the above critique, alternative solutions for the
“true conflicts” approach were suggested. Professor William
Baxter, for instance, developed a comparative impairment doctrine which stated that: “normative resolution of real conflicts
cases is possible where one of the assertedly applicable rules is
more pertinent to the case than the competing rule.”90 In contracts, another approach emerged advocating the validity of the
contract.91 According to this principle, in a dispute between parties with equal bargaining power, a contract should be upheld
as valid if it is valid under any law which the parties could have
reasonably taken into account.92

83. Currie, Comments, supra note 78, at 1242–43.
84. MARTIN, supra note 72, at 85.
85. Alfred Hill, The Judicial Function in Choice of Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1585, 1592–93 (1985).
86. Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 249, 276 (1992).
87. Baxter, supra note 28, at 9–10.
88. CAVERS, supra note 28, at 22–23.
89. Mehren, supra note 28, at 938. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
90. Baxter, supra note 28, at 9–10.
91. See generally ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1962). See also ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1967).
92. Id.
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3. The Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws
Widespread dissatisfaction with the territorial approach of
the First Restatement continued and eventually prompted the
American Law Institute’s Restatement (Second) of the Law of
Conflict of Laws.93 Professor Willis Reese, a reporter for the
Second Restatement, signaled that “conflict of laws is in a state
of flux,”94 and pointed out that “wide differences presently exist
with respect to underlying objectives and values.”95 He then
suggested that the Second Restatement “reflects contemporary
trends and cross currents respecting choice of law.”96
The Second Restatement is built around the “the concept of
locating the state with the ‘the most significant relationship’ to
the parties and the occurrence or transaction giving rise to a
lawsuit, and then applying that state’s law.”97 This principle is
behind all black-letter rules of the Second Restatement, cast in
the form of presumptions, which are rebuttable by the general
principles stated at the beginning of both chapters on torts and
contracts.98 In turn, these general principles have to be “read in
the light of the choice-influencing principles of section 6,”99
which is open-ended and policy-oriented,100 and reads as follows:
1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a
statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.
2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the
choice of the applicable rule of law include
a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
b) the relevant policies of the forum,
c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the
relative interests of those states in the determination of
the particular issue,

93. MARTIN, supra note 72, at 38.
94. Willis Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 679, 680 (1963).
95. Id.
96. Mehren, supra note 28, at 964.
97. Harold P. Southerland, A Plea for the Proper Use of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 27 VT. L. REV. 1, 8 (2002).
98. Id. at 8.
99. Id. at 9.
100. Id. at 8.
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d) the protection of justified expectations,
e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
g) ease in the determination and application of the law to
be applied. 101

Although the Second Restatement has been favorably received by judges, most academics have sharply criticized it,102
pointing out that its “unprincipled eclecticism has done little to
strengthen the intellectual underpinnings of our discipline.”103
In sum, the Second Restatement is a true reflection of the
continued flux in conflict of laws analysis. Discussing the idea
of creating the Third Restatement, a prominent scholar has
summarized the current situation in conflict of laws by stating:
“We simply cannot agree.”104 This state of flux is deepened by a
noticeable shift from a state perspective to an individual perspective105 and from a domestic perspective to international
one.106
III. THE CONFLICT OF LAWS REVOLUTION IN INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT
A. Conflict of Laws Issues Under the Traditional Interpretation
of the National Treatment Doctrine
Having rejected the territorial interpretation of national
treatment, copyright law has inherited all the flexibility, but
also the confusion, of the modern “interest analysis.” Until recently, run of the mill international copyright controversies
have not contained any difficult choice of law issues, and the
principal copyright treatises hardly needed to give more than a
passing discussion of conflict of laws issues.107 The same is true
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
102. DAVID CURRIE, HERMA HILL KAY, LARRY KRAMER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 222
(2001).
103. Friedrich K. Juenger, A Third Conflict Restatement?, 75 IND. L.J. 403,
405 (2000).
104. Aaron D. Twerski, One Size Does Not Fit All, 75 IND. L.J. 667, 667
(2000).
105. See generally Guzman, Choice of Law, supra note 1.
106. See Reimann, supra note 2, at 576; Juenger, supra note 103, at 414.
107. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property, supra note 17, at 429.
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of the major conflict of laws treatises, which have reciprocally
tended to give intellectual property short shrift.108
This lack of interest from the perspective of U.S. conflicts
scholars is explained by the fact that “the domestic multistate
dispute has prevailed as the model for primary judicial and
scholarly attention to conflicts issues in the United States.”109
Copyright controversies did not present any serious issues in
multistate domestic disputes because of preemptive federal legislation.110 On the other hand, in international copyright cases,
it was assumed that the Berne Convention principle of national
treatment, interpreted as a territorial approach, led to the
proposition that the law of the forum was the applicable law.111
B. Rejection of the Traditional Interpretation
1. Need for Uniform Marketability of Title
Globalization has dramatically changed all that. “Increased
global exploitation of copyrighted works and trademarked
products has…forced courts and scholars to reconsider the apparent simplicity of choice of law questions in intellectual property cases.”112 This change of attitude was specifically influenced by two main factors: the difficulty in locating the exact
territory where a copyrighted work originated or was disseminated;113 and the importance, for the sake of efficient world-wide
exploitation of copyrighted works, of having a single copyright
that can be enforced throughout the world.114
Efficient worldwide dissemination of copyright is closely tied
up with the question of predictability and certainty. In his
work on copyright, Paul Goldstein states that “[o]f all the criteria against which a choice of law rule is to be measured, none is
more salient that the predictability that promotes certainty in
copyright transactions.”115 In the issue of ownership, “transna108. Id.
109. Id. at 431.
110. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17
U.S.C. 101-803 (2000)).
111. STEWART, supra note 15, at 38–39.
112. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property, supra note 17, at 438.
113. Geller, supra note 7, at 28.
114. Patry, Choice of Law, supra note 19, at 392.
115. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, at 101.
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tional certainty…may best be served by a rule that establishes
a single root of title for copyright in a work, possibly in the
work’s country of origin.”116 This point of view is supported by
other scholars advocating the work’s source country (country of
first publication, or domicile, or nationality of the author) as
determining “who is the initial title holder”117 because “that
choice of law rule ensures that the work will not change owners
by operation of law each time the work crosses an international
boundary.”118
2. A New Era for the Conflict of Laws in International
Copyright Disputes: Itar-Tass v. Kurier
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Itar-Tass accepted the source country approach by holding that,
in international copyright disputes, the issue of ownership
should be governed by the law of the work’s country of origin.119
The case involved a copyright infringement suit by several
Russian newspapers and the Itar-Tass news agency against a
Russian-language newspaper published in New York. The
plaintiffs complained that the defendant had copied materials
from their newspapers. Since the copying was obvious and undisguised, the only issue of note in the case was the plaintiffs’
standing to bring the action which, in turn, depended on ownership of the copyright. It was a momentous issue, which required the Second Circuit, for the very first time, to deal with
copyright ownership in the context of conflict of laws.120 Judge
Newman concluded that the Berne Convention principle of national treatment does not contain choice of law rules.121 Then
the court proceeded to “fill in the interstices…by developing
federal common law on the conflicts issue.”122 Judge Newman
reasoned that “copyright is a form of property” and in relation
116. Id. at 102.
117. Ginsburg, Ownership, supra note 10, at 169.
118. Id.
119. Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, 153 F.3d 82, 91 (2d
Cir. 1998).
120. Id. at 88. It is also interesting to note that the District Court applied
Russian law to the issue of ownership without considering the conflict of laws
issue therein. Id.
121. Id. at 89.
122. Id. at 90.
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to property, under the Second Restatement’s approach, the governing law is “determined by the law of the state with ‘the most
significant relationship’ to the property and to the parties.”123
Relying on the Second Restatement the court concluded that
Russian law should govern the issue of ownership.124 Under
that law, newspaper articles are exempted from the general
work-for-hire doctrine, so the newspaper plaintiffs did not own
copyright in the separate articles written by their employees.
Consequently, they lacked standing to bring the action.125
Although the principle announced in Itar-Tass — that initial
ownership is determined by the law of the country of a work’s
origin, and that infringement is determined by the law of the
country of infringement — was initially disapproved by some
commentators,126 it is now generally accepted by most academics.127 While the Itar-Tass court explicitly stated that it did not
make any ruling regarding transfer or assignment of copyrights,128 the facts of Itar-Tass presented an opportune pattern
for easy transition from the traditional territorial interpretation
of the national treatment principle to a more flexible approach,
because those facts unambiguously pointed to Russia as the
country of origin, and the difference between Russian and
American law was outcome-determinative.129
Unfortunately, this bright-line rule loses its simplicity in a
slightly different set of facts. This is because, as the leading
123. Itar-Tass, 153 F.3d at 90.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 92–93 (holding, however, that the news agency plaintiff owned
the copyright in the work of its employees because it was not excluded from
the work-for-hire doctrine, under the Russian law).
126. See, e.g., David E. Miller, Finding a Conflicts Issue in International
Copyright Litigation: Did the Second Circuit Misinterpret the Berne Convention in Itar-Tass?, 8 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 239, 246 (2000) (blaming the
court for creating conflicts of law by ignoring history, rejecting legal scholarship, and ignoring relevant precedent.”).
127. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property, supra note 17, at 439;
LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW supra note 34, at 529; Paul Torremans, Choice of Law Issues in Relation to Copyright, in COPYRIGHT IN THE
CULTURAL INDUSTRIES 32, 42 (Ruth Towse ed., 2002 ); GOLDSTEIN, supra note
10, at 103.
128. Itar-Tass, 153 F.3d at 84.
129. Id. at 88. The District Court in Itar-Tass applied Russian Law without
even considering the choice of law issues in this case and their relation to the
Berne principle of national treatment. Id.
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treatise on copyright law points out, “[b]y looking to U.S. law as
the lex loci delicti to determine infringement and remedies, but
looking to the law of the “home country” to determine threshold
issues, Itar-Tass raises a host of issues.”130 These fall into three
broad categories: (1) those relating to initial copyright ownership; (2) those concerned with transfer of the copyright interest;
and (3) those arising from the copyright-contract dichotomy.
The first cluster, that concerning copyright ownership, encompasses possible difficulties in separating the issues of ownership and infringement; application of the U.S. work-for-hire
doctrine to the different settings of other countries’ laws; and, of
course, the difficulties associated with determining foreign
laws.131 Additional complications can arise in conflict of laws
analysis from the possibility of more than one country being
designated a country of origin132 “when nationality, domicile,
place of creation, or first publication are not united in the same
country.”133 Thus, the Itar-Tass approach solves the territoriality problem of national treatment, but also opens up for copyright disputes the Pandora’s box of conflict of laws problems
that have long dogged other spheres of law, such as torts and
contracts.134
Itar-Tass also expressly left open the question of which law
governs the transfer of initial copyright ownership.135 According
to Nimmer on Copyright (“Nimmer”), it would be illogical to
look to the law of the state with the most significant relationship to the property and parties in determining copyright ownership, but not to do the same thing in the “realm of assignments” 136

130. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
17.05(3) (2000) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT].
131. Id.
132. Professor Ginsburg points out that relevant factors in determination of
the law governing initial ownership of a work for hire can be: (1) country of a
nationality of an employee; (2) country of a nationality of an employer; (3)
country where the contract was localized or country determined by the choice
of law clause in the contract; (4) country of the first publication; or (5) country
of forum. Ginsburg, Ownership, supra note 10, at 168.
133. Patry, Choice of Law, supra note 19, at 421.
134. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property, supra note 17, at 442.
135. Itar-Tass, 153 F.3d at 91 n.11.
136. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 130, § 17.05(2).
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Nevertheless, the unwillingness of the Itar-Tass court to
tackle the conflict of laws in copyright assignments is understandable because this problem is even more complicated than
that of initial ownership. One aspect of it is the fundamental
question of whether copyright is transferable at all, since “some
legal systems allow for transfer of the copyright itself, while
others do not.”137 In general, civil law countries tend to be very
protective of individual authors at the expense of the policy of
free alienability favored by common law countries.138 Where an
author from a civil law country makes the kind of transfer of his
or her rights to a U.S. party that that author’s country prohibits, but U.S. law allows, a true conflict problem can arise.139
Additionally, different outcomes can result from restrictions
on alienation being characterized — as they often are — as belonging to the sphere of contracts, not copyright law.140 As Professor Ginsburg points out, “[c]oncerning transfers of copyright
ownership, potentially applicable choice of law rules include:
(1) the law chosen by the parties to the contract; (2) the law of
the country in which the contract can be localized; (3) the law of
the forum.”141 Thus, the logical extension of the interestanalysis in Itar-Tass to the assignments of copyrights can complicate the potential conflict of laws issues.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE ITAR-TASS APPROACH
IN FILMS BY JOVE V. BEROV
A. Facts of Films by Jove v. Berov
The decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York in Films by Jove clearly illustrates
both the merits of the Itar-Tass approach and the significant
137. Torremans, supra note 127, at 45.
138. Patry, Choice of Law, supra note 19, at 432.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Ginsburg, Ownership, supra note 10, at 169. See also Patry, Choice of
Law, supra note 19, at 433 (citing the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts,
which also enumerates a number of possible factors determining the applicable law in contract conflict). “[T]he place of contracting, the place of negotiation of the contract, the place of performance, the location of the subject matter of the contract, and the domicile, residency, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties.” Id.
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difficulties discussed above. Nimmer refers to Films by Jove as
a complex example of choice of law issues in international copyright.142 Films by Jove had a pattern of facts uniquely suited to
test the Itar-Tass approach. This case involved the issue of
ownership of copyright in approximately 1,500 animated films
produced by the film studio Soyuzmultfilm in Russia between
1936 and 1991. But, while the issue of ownership in this case
seems, at first blush, to be similar to that in Itar-Tass, it can be
distinguished by some important legal and social factors. The
legal factors include the fact that the animated films in Films
by Jove were restored works;143 that they were covered by the
Berne Convention § 14 bis regarding cinematographic works;144
and that there was a transfer of copyrights from the initial
rightholder.145 The social factors involved are the significant
public importance of the copyrighted subject-matter in this
case146 as well as the somewhat unusual position taken by the
Russian government in displaying a very strong interest in this
subject-matter.147
Because the subject-matter of a controversy often determines
the outcome of a legal analysis, it seems logical to begin the discussion of this case with the description of the animated films
involved in this controversy, their social importance, and the
complicated transactions in which they were involved before
proceeding to the legal analysis of the issue.
1. The Subject Matter of the Case: Cheburashka
The 1500 animated films at issue in Films by Jove were children’s classics in Russia. Each of them would reward separate
discussion, but four films dedicated to a personage called Che142. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 130, § 9.A.04 [B][2] n.92.
143. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(b) (1995) (“a restored work vests initially in the author or initial rightholder of the work as determined by the law of the source
country.”).
144. Berne Convention, supra note 14, art. 14bis.
145. See generally Films by Jove II, 250 F. Supp. 2d 156.
146. Pavell, O Svoystvakh Cheburashki [About Cheburashka’s Characteristics], in TOPOS (2003), at http://www.topos.ru/cgi.bin/articles.pl?id=1441. See
also Alexander Bratersky, Who Owns Little Cheburashka?, 736 ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES (Jan. 15, 2002), available at http://www.sptimesrussia.
com/archives/times/736/top/t_5515.htm.
147. See generally Films by Jove II, 250 F. Supp. 2d 156.

File: Gannamacro.doc

2004]

Created on: 2/14/2004 4:07 PM

Last Printed: 4/21/2004 1:48 PM

CONFLICT OF LAWS REVOLUTION

919

burashka stand apart. Cheburashka is an exotic small brown
animal with big ears and big eyes whose adventures are described in books of the Soviet writer Uspenskiy.148 These books
served as the foundation for a popular series of animated films.
The prominent role of these films is underscored by the Russian
press’ reference to Cheburashka movies as being at the heart of
this controversy in Films by Jove.149 Several generations of people in the Soviet Union were brought up with a firm belief that
Cheburashka films were a national property, an attitude that
persists even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and
turns the issue of copyright ownership in this case into a locally
sensitive matter.
In 1992, the plaintiff, an American enterprise named Films
by Jove, Inc., entered into a licensing agreement with the lease
enterprise Soyuzmultfilm Studios (“SMS”), allegedly a legal successor of a state enterprise of the same name, Soyuzmultfilm
Studios (“Soyuzmultfilm”).150 Under this agreement, Films by
Jove, Inc. acquired the right of exclusive international distribution for the animated films produced by Soyuzmultfilm.151 Subsequently, Films by Jove, Inc. invested about three million dollars in the restoration of the films and granted to the defendant,
Berov, a right to distribute them through his retail stores in
Brooklyn.152 When Berov violated the terms of the agreement,
Films by Jove, Inc. sued him for copyright infringement.153
Berov conceded the issue of infringement,154 but the case was
dramatically complicated by the intervention of a third party
plaintiff.
The third party, Federal State Unitarian Enterprise Soyuzmultfilm Studios (“FSUESMS”), is owned and controlled by the
148. USPENSKIY E., VSE O CHEBURASHKE I KROKODILE GENE [Everything
about Cheburashka and Crocodile Gena] (1967).
149. See Nickolay Kononov, Teper’ Ya Cheburashka [Now I am Cheburashka], IZVESTIYARU (2003), available at http:www.izvestia.ru/community/
34588 [hereinafter Kononov, Teper’ Ya Cheburashka]. See also Sergey Zakin,
Komu prinadlezhit Cheburashka? [Who does Cheburashka Belong to?], BBC
RUSSIAN.COM (June 30, 2003), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/newsid_30
33000/3033198.stm.
150. Films by Jove I, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 446.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 434.
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Russian state. FSUESMS alleged that it was the true owner of
the copyrighted material because it was the only lawful successor to Soyuzmultfilm. According to FSUESMS, SMS was not
the owner of the copyrights and, therefore, could not grant an
exclusive distribution license to Films by Jove, Inc. The question of ownership, thus, became the controlling issue in the
case.
2. District Court’s Analysis
Relying on the Itar-Tass ruling, Judge Trager held that initial ownership in copyright disputes should be governed by the
law of the country with the most significant relation to the matter in question. The country with the most significant relation
to the films here was clearly Russia, since the animated films
were produced there by the Soviet enterprise Soyuzmultfilm
Studios. During perestroika, this state enterprise was transformed into a lease enterprise also called Soyuzmultfilm Studios, which entered into the agreement with Films by Jove in
1992. Thus, the issue of ownership was to be decided in accordance with Soviet-Russian law. Additionally, the court noted
that the animated films were “restored works.”155 The Uruguay
Rounds Agreements Act of 1995 17 U.S.C. 104A(b), which provides for restoration of copyright in certain foreign works that
had fallen into the public domain for non-compliance with formalities, states that ownership of a restored work belongs to
“the author or initial rightholder of the work as determined by
the law of the source country of the work.”156 This provision, too,
seems to support the Itar-Tass rule dictating the choice of Russian law. Therefore, Judge Trager applied Russian law to the
facts of the case.157
155. Id. at 448.
156. 17 U.S.C. 104A(b) (1995).
157. It is interesting that the court did not mention the provision of the
Berne Convention expressly providing for the issues of ownership to cinematographic work in either of its two decisions. See generally Films by Jove I,
154 F. Supp. 2d 432; Films by Jove II, 250 F. Supp. 2d 156. The Itar-Tass
court mentioned this provision in passing, remarking that “[t]he Convention
does not purport to settle issues of ownership, with one exception not relevant
to this case.” Itar-Tass, 153 F.3d at 91. This exception provides that “ownership of copyright in a cinematographic work shall be a matter for legislation in
the country where protection is claimed.” Id. at 91 n.12 (citing Berne Conven-
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Judge Trager saw the central issue as whether the lease enterprise, Soyuzmultfilm Studios, was the rightful owner of the
copyrights to the films – for, if it was, then it had the power to
grant Films by Jove, Inc. the exclusive right to distribute them
abroad. Matters, however, were hardly that simple. The court
faced the difficult problem of trudging through the legal jungle
of the privatization process in post-Soviet Russia and of wading
through the complex legal metamorphosis of the Soviet state
enterprise Soyuzmultfilm, which first turned into a lease enterprise in 1989,158 and then became a joint stock company in
1999.159 Additionally, the court had to sort out the formation, in
1999, of the FSUESMS, which also claimed to be a successor to
Soyuzmultfilm.
After a detailed and thoughtful discussion of the relevant Soviet-Russian law, the court concluded that the Soviet state enterprise Soyuzmultfilm was the initial owner of the copyrights,160 which were thereafter transferred to the lease enterprise by operation of law161 when the state enterprise was transformed into the lease enterprise.162 Consequently, these rights

tion, Art 14bis(2)(a)). Although the Itar-Tass court discussed what implicit
meaning this provision could have for the works not included in the abovementioned provision, its meaning for the works included in the provision also
remains open to interpretation. However, the Berne Convention is not selfexecutory. This means that its provisions can be binding on domestic U.S.
courts only through implementation by legislation passed by Congress. Additionally, in the case of Films by Jove, this provision is in conflict with U.S.
Copyright Law vesting ownership of a restored work in “the author or initial
rightholder of the work as determined by the law of the source country of the
work.” 17 U.S.C. 104A(b).
158. Films by Jove I, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 435.
159. Id. at 436.
160. Id. at 456 n.28.
161. The court referred to Itar-Tass’ explicit exclusion of the assignment of
rights issue from the holding of the case and stated that there was no reason
to consider assignment of rights in this case because, at the heart of the controversy here, is the issue of the ownership. Id. at 477 n.42. Although the
court seemed to avoid venturing into a new land of conflict of laws in copyright assignments, its decision is justified by the purely domestic character of
the copyright transfers. According to Nimmer, it was perfectly logical in a
domestic dispute to use the law of the source country to determine the issue of
assignment as well as the issue of ownership. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra
note 130, § 17.05(2).
162. Films by Jove I, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 477.
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were not limited by the lease, and its expiration did not cause
them to expire.163
In its analysis, the court considered numerous inconsistent
decisions from Russian commercial courts (Arbitrazh courts) of
different levels,164 where the adversaries (SMS and the
FSUESMS) disputed the validity of each other’s corporate registration.165 The most relevant opinion, however, was that of a
lower level court (Moscow Region Arbitrazh Court) on December
26, 2000, stating that “…copyrights to animated films created
by the state enterprise ‘Film Studios Soyuzmultfilm’ were
transferred by operation of law to its successor – lease enterprise ‘Film Studios Soyuzmultfilm.’”166 They could, therefore,
not be transferred by the lease agreement nor limited by another agreement.167 Although this decision was later vacated by
the intermediate court (the Federal Arbitrazh Court for the District of Moscow), the Films by Jove court found the vacating decision to be “incoherent and, more important, irrelevant to the
issue of copyright transfer.”168 The court concluded that the reasoning of the December 26th opinion “remained unscathed.”169
Judge Trager also relied on the implication in the case record
that the court of the highest level in Russia (the Higher Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation) might have a different
view of the case.170 The District Court, therefore, granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on August 27, 2001.171
Contrary to the District Court’s expectations, however, the
Higher Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation issued an
opinion three months later in favor of FSUESMS — overruling
the lower courts’ decisions.172 The Higher Court stated that “the
163. Id.
164. Russian commercial courts consist of “a lower court level, an appeals
court level, a second appellate court level in the Federal Arbitrazh Court for
the District of Moscow and a final appellate level in the Higher Arbitrazh
Court of the Russian Federal.” Id. at 439 n.17. See also HIROSHI ODA,
RUSSIAN COMMERCIAL LAW 24–28 (2002).
165. Films by Jove I, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 439–46.
166. Id. at 441 (quoting the decision of Moscow Region Arbitrazh Court).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 474.
169. Id. at 475.
170. Films by Jove I, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 474.
171. Id. at 480.
172. Films by Jove II, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 158.
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relevant provisions of the leasing statute did not provide for the
conversion of a state enterprise into a lease entity, and furthermore that any succession of rights from a state enterprise
to the lease entity would not survive the expiration of the lease
term.”173
In response to the defendants’ motion for reconsideration,174
Judge Trager confessed that the Higher Court’s decision had
undermined “certain operative premises” which supported his
previous decision,175 but he refused to reconsider it, because the
Higher Arbitrazh Court’s decision proved to be “clearly erroneous.”176 Additionally, Judge Trager found evidence on the record
that the Higher Arbitrazh Court’s decision was “strongly influenced, if not coerced, by the efforts of various Russian government officials seeking to promote ‘state interests.’”177 In these
circumstances, he questioned the independence of the Russian
judiciary and affirmed his earlier ruling.
B. Problems of Copyright Law Revealed in Films by Jove
Films by Jove demonstrates four problems inherent in the
Itar-Tass approach: (1) the conflict of laws problems; (2) difficulties in interpretation of foreign laws; (3) the required degree of
deference to parallel decisions of foreign courts; (4) and the international impact of the decision, in particular its effect on international transactions.
1. Conflict of Laws Problems
As with Itar-Tass, the facts of Films by Jove unambiguously
pointed to Russia as the country of origin for the films.178 The
173. Id. at 174.
174. Id. at 159.
175. Id. at 191.
176. Id. at 205.
177. Id. at 216.
178. On the other hand, contrary to Itar-Tass, in Films by Jove, the copyrighted works are covered by both provisions regulating the choice of law in
international copyright: Article 14bis(2) of the Berne Convention and Section
104A(b) of the Copyright Act because animated films at the heart of this case
are both cinematographic works under Article 14bis(2) and restored works
under Section 104A(b) of the Copyright Act. According to Article 14bis(2) the
issue of their ownership has to be controlled by the law of the protecting country, i.e. the United States. Conversely, under Section 104A(b) the issue of
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issue of initial ownership was, therefore, to be determined by
Russian law because all the participants were Russian nationals and the place of origin was clearly Russia. On the other
hand, in contrast to Itar-Tass, Films by Jove involved transfers
of the copyright, but the court concluded that there was no reason to consider transfer of rights because the dispositive issue
was that of ownership.179 Sometimes, it is difficult to draw a
bright line between ownership and transfer of rights, but in a
purely domestic transfer of rights it does not seem proper to go
only halfway and not to use the law of the source country.180
The transfer of copyright from Soyuzmultfilm to SMS, being a
purely domestic transaction, cannot be meaningfully distinguished from the issue of initial ownership.
2. Difficulties in Interpretation of Foreign Laws
In contrast to the comparatively simple task of interpreting
foreign copyright law in Itar-Tass, the foreign law issues in
Films by Jove are significantly more challenging. The Films by
Jove court had not only to interpret the Soviet-Russian copyright law, but also to grapple with the messy and inconsistent
process of privatization in Russia.181 The court successfully
coped with its immediate task, but the increase in international
copyright disputes will undoubtedly compel significant expendiownership has to be controlled by the law of the source country, i.e. Russia.
Then, the relevant question is which of these two provisions has supremacy.
The Berne Implementation Act of 1988 amends the Copyright Act to provide
that “[t]he provisions of the Berne Convention…shall not be enforceable in
any action brought pursuant to the provisions of the Berne Convention itself.”
17 U.S.C. § 104(c). Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the provision of
the Copyright Act shall have a priority. Evidently, the district court came to
the same conclusion by applying the Russian law to the issue of ownership.
179. Films by Jove I, 154 F. Supp.2d at 477 n.42.
180. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 130, § 17.05(2).
181. Paul B. Stephan, A Becoming Modesty — U.S. Litigation in the Mirror
of International Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 636–37 (2002) [hereinafter
Stephan, A Becoming Modesty] (commenting that “until the introduction of
elements of a market economy, that nation had the most of formal engagements with intellectual property law generally and copyright law in particular. Even now, more than a decade after the end of the Soviet Union, most
copyright rules remain precatory and aspirational. Precise questions of ownership turn on the legitimacy of convoluted enterprise reorganizations and
privatization transactions that took place during a period of radical legal instability.”).
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ture of judicial time on understanding and interpreting foreign
copyright laws.
3. Degree of Deference to Parallel Decisions of Foreign Courts
Another problem is the potential conflict between the United
States courts’ interpretation of a foreign law and that of the
source country’s court. Discussing the Itar-Tass decision, Nimmer pointed out that the U.S. courts would have to decide
whether the decisions of a foreign court of the highest level deserved deference or, possibly, refuse to follow that court’s pronouncements because they come from a civil law system, which
lacks a system of stare decisis.182 Nimmer concluded that these
matters remained “unaddressed in the ruling, and hence unanswered at present.”183 In Films by Jove, the court’s answer to
the latter question was a refusal to follow the decisions of the
highest court in Russia, in part because Russia does not have
the doctrine of stare decisis, and in part because the decision of
the court was unduly influenced by the government.184 The
court’s rejection of the Russian judiciary’s opinion in this case is
justified. As Professor Stephan, who was a plaintiffs’ expert in
Films by Jove, wrote, “it appeared that the Russian government
had taken actions it did largely to influence the outcome of the
U.S. case.”185 It is also obvious that the Higher Arbitrazh
Court’s decision, subsequent to Professor Stephan’s paper, was
instigated by the desire to influence the U.S. litigation.186 This
evidence of undue influence on the Russian judiciary placed the
court in a strange dilemma: it could not ignore Russian law, but
neither could it give effect to the Russian judiciary’s tainted
interpretation of the law. Such disparity of interpretation of
foreign laws is particularly troublesome because it undermines
the policy of comity.

182. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 130, § 17.05(3).
183. Regarding the Itar-Tass ruling, Nimmer enumerated some of the questions concerning the issue of deference to foreign courts decisions. For example, “[i]s it only a decision of the highest court that deserves deference? Or
should even that court’s pronouncements not be followed, to the extent that
they come from a civil law system, which lacks a system of stare decisis?” Id.
184. Films by Jove II, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 205, 216.
185. Id.
186. Films by Jove II, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 208–12.
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4. The International Impact of the Decision
Perhaps the most important issue in international legal disputes, however, remains the international impact of the decision. In Films by Jove, the immediate impact was the plaintiff’s
successful assertion of its distribution rights in the animated
films against Berov’s infringement. But this may be a limited
victory, for it is not at all clear that the defendant FSUESMS
can be prevented from distributing the films in other parts of
the world.187
Yet, paradoxically, despite these difficulties of worldwide enforceability, Films by Jove has broad political ramifications because it is a serious obstacle in the way of the Russian government’s attempt to repossess the assets it lost during the period
of privatization in Russia. Indeed, the decision prompted a
plethora of publications in Russia and in Russian-speaking
communities all over the world. Many supported the decision,188
but some complained that an American court had robbed the
Russian people of their cultural legacy.189 Most agreed that
Russia’s international image had been tarnished.190 This broad
political impact is both beneficial and detrimental. It is detrimental because it could exacerbate a conflict between nations.
But it is beneficial because it reminds governments of the importance of the Rule of Law. If a country’s own judiciary is not
up to the task or shirks its responsibility, courts of other countries may need to step into the breach. The U.S. judiciary need
not sacrifice justice for the sake of comity.

187. See Zakin, Komu prinadlezhit Cheburashka?, supra note 149 (the head
of FSUESMS publicly stating his intention to enter the international agreements concerning the distribution of the animated films in disregard of the
above decision).
188. See id. Oleg Sulkin, Nekotoriye Osobennosti Natsional’nogo Piratstva
[Some Peculiarities of National Piracy], NOVOYE RUSSKOYE SLOVO, July 19-20,
2003, at 18; Oleg Sulkin, Mozhno li Krast’ v Gostiakh Serebrianiye Lozhki?
[Are You Allowed to Steal Silver Spoons?], RUSSKIY ZHURNAL, Oct. 17, 2003,
available at http://www.russ.ru/culture/cinema/20031017_sul.html.
189. See Kononov, Teper’ Ya Cheburashka, supra note 149.
190. See Sulkin, Nekotoriye Osobennosti Natsional’nogo Piratstva, supra
note 188; Sulkin, Mozhno li Krast’ v Gostiakh Serebrianiye Lozhki?, supra
note 179; Zakin, Komu prinadlezhit Cheburashka?, supra note 188.
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V. FROM THE ITAR-TASS APPROACH TO UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT
A. The Need for Uniformity in International Copyright Disputes
The shift from the territoriality of national treatment to the
functional approach of Itar-Tass goes a long way towards satisfying the need for copyright’s worldwide marketability. The
importance of the international marketability of copyrights, as
previously noted, stems from the transition from an industrial
to an information economy,191 a tendency attested to by TRIPs’
linkage between intellectual property and trade.192 Apart from
TRIPs, scholars also increasingly relate copyright to property in
general,193 as in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Law’s
principle for immovable property, on which the Itar-Tass court
relied. Although this tendency is criticized for not taking into
consideration the special character of intellectual property,194 it
satisfies an important need in the modern development of copyright law. Until there is a universal copyright law protecting
the rights of authors and guaranteeing marketability of copyrights worldwide, academics and judges must go on elaborating
alternative ways of attaining these goals. But, the obstacles
already noted — a lack of consensus in the general choice of law
doctrine, problems with characterization of the issues as ownership or transfer of copyrights, characterization of transfers under contracts or copyright law, difficulties in interpretation of
foreign laws, the uncertainty regarding the required deference
to foreign judgments, and effectiveness of foreign judgment enforcement — remain. Most of these are amply illustrated in
Films by Jove. Although a universal copyright law is the ulti191. Brennan, supra note 12, at 316.
192. See Guzman, International Antitrust, supra note 63, at 950.
193. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108, 113 (1990). See also Lawrence R. Ahern, III,
“Workouts” Under Revised Article 9: A Review of Changes and Proposal for
Study, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 115, 131–32 (2001) (noting that Revised
UCC Article 9 broadens the definition of accounts to include, among other
things, “fees and royalties due from the licensing of intellectual property and
proprietary information (such as patents, copyrights and trademarks) and fees
from software licenses…”).
194. See Brennan, supra note 12, at 316 (“Trying to force fit intellectual
property into the confines of industrial goods law is reminiscent of the ugly
sisters of Cinderella butchering their feet to fit slippers never meant for
them.”).
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mate solution, that would require a consensus that is, as of yet,
unattainable. In the meantime, scholars have proposed various
stop-gap ameliorations briefly noted below. They are the middle ground between the universal and the particular.
B. The Compromise Between National Copyright Laws
and the Need for Uniformity
1. The Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Approach
The Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition of
Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters by Professors Rochelle Dreyfuss and Jane Ginsburg195 addresses the enforceability of judgments and the need for an effective resolution of international copyright disputes.196 It envisions the adoption of a
convention under the auspices of the current international organizations, such as the WIPO or WTO.197 Such a convention
would be open to countries that are members of TRIPs and
would cover approximately the same scope of rights.198 It would
also contain the elaboration of the rules of cooperation among
courts in the cases of parallel litigation,199 solidification of
claims,200 and choice of law rules.201 Although this approach
solves many problems of international copyright litigation, its
success depends on its formal adoption or accession by states,
which is anathema to the jealously cherished freedom of sovereign states to determine their own copyright policy. In this respect, TRIPs may be the high water mark for years to come.202
195. See generally Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 25.
196. Id. at 1065.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1068.
199. Id. at 1069–71.
200. Id. at 1071.
201. Id.
202. Many scholars point out the internal conflict between developing and
developed countries embodied in TRIPs and its threat to enforceability. See
J.H. Reichman & Pamela Sanderson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50
VAND. L. REV. 51, 97 (1997) (commenting that “[u]niversal intellectual property standards embodied in the TRIPs Agreement became enforceable within
the framework of a World Trade Organization, largely as the result of sustained pressures by a coalition of powerful manufacturing associations in
Europe, the United States, and Japan.”); Peter K. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-sum
Approach to Resolving Global Intellectual Property Disputes: What We Can
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In the case of parallel litigation, the success of the proposal will
depend on unprecedented cooperation among various national
courts. As amply shown in Films by Jove, it is not realistic to
expect U.S. courts to defer to the decisions of Russian courts in
a case where the strong interests of an American plaintiff are
involved and the defendant is also an American company. It is
equally unrealistic to expect a Russian court to defer to a U.S.
court’s interpretation of Russian law. Consequently, although
the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg model boldly tackles many of the difficulties encountered in international copyright disputes, its realization is by no means certain.
2. The Graeme Dinwoodie Approach
In contrast to the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg model’s concentration
on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments, Professor
Graeme Dinwoodie’s approach is directed at substantive issues.203 Instead of applying the variegated copyright law of different countries, “the substantive method suggests that the
court develop a solution that accommodates more than one interest.”204 Dinwoodie noted that “[w]hen compared with the traditional negotiation of treaties, national court’s development of
‘international law’ is more responsive to social conditions and
hence more dynamic.”205 He does acknowledge that his approach can be criticized for lack of certainty. His response is
that “in the long term some ex ante uncertainty might be worth
the gains in terms of aptness and legal rules.”206 Nevertheless,
it seems inevitable that a court’s process of weighing the interests and trying to accommodate more than one would lead to an
intolerable amount of uncertainty, confusion and inconsistency.
Indeed, it is not clear how the substantive approach of Professor
Learn From Mediators, Business Strategists, and International Relations
Theorists, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 569, 581 (2002) (noting that although TRIPs succeeds in providing higher standards for the protection of intellectual property,
“it masks the significant cultural and ideological differences between developed and less developed countries…”).
203. See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture of the International Intellectual Property System, 77 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 993 (2002) [hereinafter Dinwoodie, The Architecture].
204. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order, supra note 26, at 564.
205. Dinwoodie, The Architecture, supra note 203, at 1011.
206. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order, supra note 26, at 572.
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Dinwoodie could ever resolve the dispute in a case like Films by
Jove.
3. A Supranational Body of Principles of Equity
a. Foundation
As mentioned at the outset, this Note suggests that the most
promising approach is the supplementation of the above ameliorative proposals by a supranational body of equitable principles.
This body of principles does not amount to universal copyright
law; rather, it is a measured safeguard against some of the
dangers associated with the process of balancing conflicting interests and policies. One commentator suggests the idea of a
“global justice-constituency” which will need, first, to “articulate
what the public purpose [of copyright] is at the global level, instead of simply transporting ready-made purposes and rules
from national jurisdictions”207 and, second, to “formulate rules,
norms, and concepts that are carefully calibrated to achieve
that public purpose.”208 Such a body of laws can serve as a solid
foundation for the development of universal copyright law and
also help solve some difficult situations when policies of several
foreign states are deadlocked in a particular copyright dispute.
In a somewhat similar vein, this Note suggests the elaboration of a supranational body of equitable norms, which will help
to ensure justice in international disputes when the conflict of
law doctrine does not give a clear indication as to what interest
should prevail, or when that indication egregiously contradicts
the general principles of fairness and justice. This approach is
supported by Andrew Guzman’s idea that the purpose of choice
of law rules is to increase global welfare — as opposed to the
traditional approach of simply protecting “governmental interest.”209 Equitable principles such as those of promissory estoppel, protection of a good faith purchaser, and apparent agency
should be included in this supranational body of law. Some of
them are, indeed, present in the national laws of many foreign

207. Murumba, supra note 8, at 459.
208. Id.
209. Guzman, Choice of Law, supra note 1, at 49.
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countries.210 The goal of solidifying them into a robust supranational body of equitable norms is not unattainable. It can be
done through both international regulation as well as private
adjudication. Some hail formal regulation, such as that signaled by the spectacular success of Berne and TRIPs. Others,
however, may see private adjudication as more promising on
the view that courts are more dynamic than public international law-making.211 Through adjudication norms can be elaborated in the course of judicial dialogue, during which courts
“will be hammering out both doctrinal solutions and direct relationships to manage the increasingly complex job of multijurisdictional dispute resolution.”212 This Note argues that regulation and private adjudication complement each other, just like
their product, supranational equitable norms, complements the
ameliorative Dreyfuss-Ginsburg and Dinwoodie models.
b. Application of Equitable Principles to Films by Jove
i. Theory of Apparent Authority
The common law doctrine of apparent authority is a wellsettled principle of the law of agency which “exists to protect
third parties who are misled by appearances.”213 According to
the Restatement (Second) of Agency (1958), “apparent authority
to do an act is created as to a third person by written or spoken
word or any other conduct of the principal which, reasonably
interpreted, causes the third person to believe that the principal
consents to have the act done on his behalf by the person pur-

210. See generally H.L.E. VERHAGEN, AGENCY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1995); Wolfram Müller-Freienfels, Legal Relations in the Law of Agency:
Power of Agency and Commercial Certainty, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 193 (1964);
Larry A. DiMatteo, Recent Development: Contract Talk: Reviewing the Historical and Practical Significance of the Principles of European Contract Law, 43
HARV. INT’L L.J. 569 (2002). See also Wendell H. Holmes & Symeon C. Symeonides, Representation, Mandate, and Agency: A Kommentar on Louisiana’s
New Law, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1087 (1999) (discussing the inclusion of equitable
norms in Louisiana’s revised code).
211. See Dinwoodie, The Architecture, supra note 203, at 1011.
212. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103,
1124 (2000).
213. DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP: EXAMPLES AND
EXPLANATIONS 26 (1995).
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porting to act for him.”214 It is important to note that apparent
authority to bind the principal can exist even when there is no
actual agency.215 Apparent authority is a synthesis of two separate policies underlying the doctrine: the first holds that, between two innocent parties, the loss should be placed on the
party who could have more easily avoided the confusion; and
the second is the protection of the normal commercial operations.216 Because of these important policies, the doctrine of apparent authority is widely applied in various spheres of U.S.
law.217
The versatility of the doctrine of apparent authority can be illustrated by its application to the facts of Films by Jove. As
their alternative theory, the Plaintiffs in that case advanced the
argument that the Russian government either “induced [Films
by Jove, Inc.’s] reasonable reliance by cloaking the lease enterprise with apparent authority to license the Soyuzmultfilm
Studio copyrights; or had the effect of ratifying…the licensing
agreement after it was executed.”218 The facts of the case leave
no doubt that the plaintiff Films by Jove, Inc., had every reason
to believe that SMS was the true owner of copyrights given to it
214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27 (1958).
215. KLEINBERGER, supra note 213, at 27.
216. Id. at 36.
217. See, e.g., Nancy R. Furnari, Comment: Are Traditional Agency Principles Effective for Internet Transactions, Given the Lack of Personal Interaction?, 63 ALB. L. REV. 537 (1999) (discussing the role of apparent authority in
consumer protection for internet transactions); Rachael E. Schwartz, “And
Tomorrow?” The Torture Victim Protection Act, 11 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
271 (1994) (Torture Victim Protection Act); John W. Larson, Florida’s New
Partnership Law: The Revised Uniform Partnership Act and Limited Liability
Partnerships, 23 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 201 (1995) (laws of partnership); Robert
Emerson, Franchisors’ Liability When Franchisees are Apparent Agents: An
Empirical and Policy Analysis of “Common Knowledge” About Franchising, 20
HOFSTRA L. REV. 609 (1992) (franchisors’ liability); Frank Partnoy, The Shifting Contours of Global Derivatives Regulation, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 421,
470-472 (2001). See also Meeting of OAS-CIDIP-VI Drafting Committee on
Secured Transactions Conference Transcript Day Three: XI. Electronic Commerce Aspects of Secured Transactions, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 491 (2001)
(securities); Jeffrey A. Parness & Austin W. Bartlett, Unsettling Questions
Regarding Lawyer’s Civil Claim Settlement Authority, 78 OR. L. REV. 1061
(1999); Jeffrey A. Parness & Austin W. Bartlett, The Authority of Illinois
Lawyers to Settle Their Clients: On Principles Not Quite Settled, 31 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 199, 220–21 (2000) (lawyers’ civil claim settlement authority).
218. Films by Jove II, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 214.
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by the Russian state. The plaintiff’s reliance was both reasonable in the circumstances, and it was caused by numerous acts
and omissions of the Russian government, such as the letter of
September 16, 1992, sent to SMS by a state official confirming
SMS’s worldwide distribution rights in the films;219 the January
22, 1997 document from the Russian State Taxation Auditors,
which “specifically references the lease enterprise’s 1992
agreement with [Films by Jove, Inc.], indicating that the lease
enterprise paid taxes on the proceeds received from [Films by
Jove, Inc.];220 and the two licensing agreements between SMS
and state-owned Russian television studios.”221 Although the
state was fully aware of the licensing agreement between SMS
and Films by Jove, Inc., it did not claim copyrights or challenge
the agreement. On the contrary, by its letter of September 16,
1992 the government actually represented to Films by Jove, Inc.
that the license agreement was valid. Elementary notions of
justice and fairness do not leave any doubt that the plaintiff
who relied, in good faith, on the state’s acts and omissions
should prevail. Under the law of agency in the United States,
therefore, the plaintiffs should, and would be likely to, win their
case.
ii. Conflict of Laws Issues
However, there remains the issue of determining which country’s substantive law should be applied to the problem of agency
and the equities of the case. It is reasonable to conclude that
Russian law should apply because both the agent and the principle were in Russia. Unfortunately, the principle of equity in
Russian law is even less developed than Russian copyright
law.222 Consequently, the very same problems we encountered
earlier — interpreting foreign law, the degree of deference to
the foreign court judgments, and the threat of pervasive incentive to a court of a foreign country to distort its interpretation of

219. Films by Jove II, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 214.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 215.
222. See generally ANDREYEV, PREDSTAVITEL’STVO V GRAZHDANSOM PRAVE
[Representation in Civil Code] (1978); Kuz’mishin A., Klassifikatziya Predstavitel’stva i Polnomochiya v Grazhdanskom Prave [Classification of Representation and Mandate in Civil Code], 8 KHOZIAYSTVO I PRAVO 27–36 (2000).
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the law in order to influence the outcome of the international
dispute — are still with us.
On the other hand, it seems improper in these circumstances
for an American court to apply the American law of equity to
the assignment of rights in Films by Jove. Although there is no
clear answer to this question in the international choice of law
doctrine,223 most of the existing approaches seem to disapprove
it.
The approach most widely adhered to is lex loci actus.224 According to this approach, the law of the place where the agent
acts determines the issues of agency. It is argued that the purpose of this approach is to protect commercial intercourse, in
particular a third party’s position, because it requires the third
party to consult only the law of the country where the agent
acts.225 However, lex loci actus is variously interpreted to mean
the law of the country where the agent really commits his acts,
the law of the country where the agent has to act according to
his agreement with the principal, the law of the country where
the agent has his place of business, or the law of the country
that governs the contract between the agent and the third
party.226 When applied to Films by Jove, all these interpretations, except the last one, point to the use of Russian law.227 Indeed, even the last one does not unequivocally point to American law: although it is true that the contract between SMS and
Films by Jove, Inc. contained a choice of law clause stipulating
that the law of California apply to issues arising under the contract,228 it is doubtful that, under the apparent authority argu223. In a recently decided case, the New York Court of Appeals found
American Law, rather than Russian law, controlling the issue of the contract
validity and apparent authority because of the choice of law clause in the contract and New York’s significant ties. Indosuez Int’l Fin. B.V. v. Nat’l Reserve
Bank, 98 N.Y.2d 238 (2002).
224. VERHAGEN, supra note 210, at 73.
225. Id. at 74.
226. VERHAGEN, supra note 210, at 75.
227. Section 292(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws also
clearly points to Russian law stating that the principle will be bound “under
the local law of the state where the agent dealt with the third person, provided at least that the principle had authorized the agent to act on his behalf
in that state or had led the third person reasonably to believe that the agent
has such authority.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 292(2).
228. Films by Jove II, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 215.
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ment, Russia as the principal should be bound by California law
by dint of this choice of law clause.
Moreover, the choice of law rules in the law of equity do not
always protect the third party to the transaction, nor do they
have the virtues of certainty and predictability. This is because of different local laws and the difficulties embedded in the
modern choice of law doctrine already noted herein. So, the
combination of local equitable protection with conflict of laws
rules does not really resolve the problem. The suggested solution lies in a particular construction of the equitable principles
which sidesteps many of the difficulties just mentioned.
c. Supranational Norms of Equity as the Safe-Guards in
International Copyright
This Note proposes the idea of a supranational body of equitable principles as the solution to obvious distortions encountered in the processes of resolving disputes by a straight balancing of conflicting interests in the interest of justice. Many countries already have the principles of equity mentioned in their
laws, though the level of protection can vary and some states
may not have every principle found in others.229 Nevertheless, it
seems that uniform norms of equity protecting commerce are
much easier for nations to accept than drastic changes in national copyright laws. Supranational equitable principles are,
therefore, a more viable avenue for correcting the grossly unjust
outcomes that conflicts in international copyright laws would
countenance.
In a case like Films by Jove, a supranational body of equitable principles could be relied on to protect the plaintiff from the
skewed decisions of Russian Arbitrazh courts of different levels.
Supranational equitable principles would help to balance the
interests of the parties and avoid direct conflicts with other
countries’ laws. Under this approach, U.S. courts would not
have to argue with the Russian judiciary over whether, under
Russian law, the ownership of the copyrights belonged, or not,
to SMS at the moment of its licensing agreement with Films by
229. See Symposium, Responding to the Obstacles to Electronic Commerce
in Latin America: General Questionnaire, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 23, 43–
49 (2000); Meeting of OAS-CIDIP-VI, supra note 217, at 558–64.
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Jove. It would be sufficient to say that, under international
principles of equity, acts and omissions of the Russian government clothed SMS with apparent authority to give worldwide
distribution rights to Films by Jove, and directed the latter’s
reasonable reliance. The Russian government would be precluded from interfering with Films by Jove, Inc.’s exercise of its
rights.
CONCLUSION
The body of supranational equitable principles, including apparent authority, should be developed to serve as safeguards for
the serious problems inherent in the straight functional approach to conflict of laws adopted in Itar-Tass. Though supranational equitable principles are uniform (as their name implies), these equitable principles are more palatable because
they do not rise to the level of universal copyright law, and because they already exist in the major legal systems of the world.
They are not the lightning rod that a fully-fledged copyright law
might be; yet they provide more or less the same benefits:
smoother international copyright commerce. Their reach is not
greater than their grasp, nor is it less than what is realistically
attainable. They are the ideal interim measure while consensus
builds for a universal copyright law, and may, indeed, contribute to the attainment of that happy but still elusive end.
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